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8  Savings and Investment 
During each of Korea’s periods of rapid debt accumulation, virtually all of 
the additional foreign borrowing was used to finance current account deficits. 
Since domestic  investment  must  be financed through some combination of 
domestic and foreign  savings, foreign  savings-r  the deficit  in the current 
account-is  exactly  equal to the imbalance  between domestic savings  and 
investment. 
In this chapter we examine the behavior of  the current account  from the 
savings-investment perspective.  The decomposition is especially  interesting 
for Korea because  its experience differs markedly  from that of  many other 
debtor  countries.  A  frequently  observed pattern  is for the current account 
deficit  to increase  as government  savings  decline and  then  for a  current 
account improvement to be attained, at least in the short run, through cuts in 
(public and private) investment and in government expenditure, thus raising 
government savings.  Relatively little of  the adjustment tends to be achieved 
through private sector savings. 
Korean experience contrasts with the “stylized”  scenario with respect to 
the  roles  of  investment, public  savings, and  private  savings.  First,  fiscal 
deficits have  played  at most  a minor role  in current account deterioration. 
Instead,  increases  in  fixed  investment,  associated  with  new  economic 
development strategies,  have outpaced rising private savings. This leaves the 
door open for a jump in required foreign financing to cover either unexpected 
surges  in  inventory  accumulation  or  unexpected  drops in  private  savings. 
The series of five-year economic and social plans have played a critical role 
through  their  impact on investment.  Second, the reduction  of  the  current 
account deficit during the recovery is achieved without a substantial decline 235  KoredChapter 8 
in investment.  The adjustment  comes from increased domestic  savings, the 
lion's  share of which is generated by the household sector. 
This pattern  is illustrated by  figure 8.1.  The plot  shows the behavior of 
gross fixed investment and of domestic savings less inventory accumulation, 
each  as  a  share  of  GNP.  Accounting  identities  imply  that  the  difference 
between  these  two  variables  is equal  to the  current  account.  When  fixed 
investment  is  larger  than  the  excess  of  domestic  savings  over  inventory 
accumulation,  the  current  account  is  in  deficit,  while  small  investment 
relative to the adjusted domestic savings is the counterpart of current account 
In  broad  terms,  fixed investment  has  behaved  like a  step function  with 
rapid  increases  during  1965-68  and jumps in  1974 and  1979. There has 
been considerably more variation in the adjusted savings variable. The large 
current  account  deficits during  1970-71,  1974-75,  and  1980-81  follow 
rises  in fixed investment,  but are precipitated primarily by reduced  savings 
and/or  increased  inventories.  Similarly,  the  current  account  improvements 
are explained by increased domestic savings relative to inventory accumula- 
tion, with only a small role for reduced fixed investment. 
The remaining  sections  of  the  chapter  examine savings  and  investment 
behavior in more detail. We turn first to domestic savings in section 8.1, and 
then to investment and the role of the five-year plans in section 8.2. The data 
used in this chapter are based on the old System of National Accounts (SNA) 
decomposition.  This allowed  a  long enough time  series  for the empirical 
surplus. 
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Fig. 8.1  Current account imbalance: ratios of investment and savings to GNP 236  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
estimates. Furthermore, the new SNA data required to decompose domestic 
savings were only available for a few years at the time of  this analysis. The 
data and the methods used for disaggregation are described in section 8.3. 
8.1  Domestic Savings 
In table 8.1 we  show the behavior of  domestic savings, foreign savings, 
and  investment from  1965 to  1984. The  top panel  gives  the  variables in 
levels, while the bottom takes each variable relative to GNP. Evident from 
the table is the rise in savings from less than  15 percent of  GNP during the 
mid-1960s to nearly 30 percent by  the end of  the  1970s. Also clear is that 
this impressive growth has been interrupted by drops of as much as 6 percent 
from  one  year  to  the  next.  Three  sources  of  domestic  savings are  also 
identified: general government, public  and  private corporations,  and other 
(including households and unincorporated businesses).  Unfortunately, it  is 
not possible to break the components down more finely. 
The data  show there has  been  a significant shift from government and 
corporations to  households as  a  source  of  savings.  In  1965 government 
savings constituted nearly half of the total, with household and other savings 
the smallest component, accounting for less than 18 percent of the total. By 
1984 household  savings had  grown to nearly 45  percent of  the total.  The 
share of corporate savings was 27 percent, representing a drop of  10 percent. 
The  contribution  of  government  savings  had  fallen  even  more,  also 
accounting for about 28 percent of  the total by  1984. 
Figure 8.2 shows government, corporate, and household savings relative 
to GNP during  1965-84.  The three  series have  behaved  quite differently. 
With  the exception of  the  permanent increase in  1972, corporate  savings 
have  remained  relatively  flat,  declining  only  slightly  during  economic 
downturns. One explanation for the increase in  1972 is the impact of  the 
financial crisis and the August Emergency Decree, which effectively caused 
a transfer from lenders in the unofficial money market (UMM) to borrowers. 
The measure thereby succeeded in significantly reducing the activities of the 
UMM  during  the  next  year,  nearly  eliminating  an  important  source  of 
corporate finance. The transfer and the tighter access to funds would both be 
expected to increase corporate savings. Cole and Park (1983, 167) argue that 
any effects of the decree were short-lived, however, there does seem to have 
been  a  sustained effect on  corporate savings. Corporate savings averaged 
0.053 percent of  GNP from  1965 to  1971 and, excluding the jump to 0.09 
percent during 1972, averaged 0.075 percent during 1973-85. 
Government savings have fluctuated more than corporate savings, but have 
been considerably less variable than household savings. The graph in  figure 
8.2 documents a small rise from  1967 to  1970, a decline during 1971-75, 
and a gradual return to government saving rates on the order of 6 percent of Table 8.1  Domestic Savings by Source,  1965-84 
Domestic Savings  Current  Gross Investment 
Account  Statistical 
Year  Total  Government  Corporate  Other  Deficit  Discrepancy  Total  Fixed  Stocks 
Panel A (in billions of won) 
1965  113.30  51.90 
1966  182.40  61.60 
1967  206.70  89.00 
1968  311.90  134.20 
1969  476.80  157.40 
1970  487.00  201.60 
1971  550.70  198.50 
1972  753.90  163.40 
1973  1,301.10  231.00 
1974  1,582.80  219.80 
1975  2,037.10  407.90 
1976  3.480.00  880.70 
1977  5,087.80  974.40 
1978  7,122.50  1,554.70 
1979  8,993.80  2,185.90 
1980  8,405.00  2,196.10 
1981  10,260.60  2,915.10 
1982  11,960.00  3,235.00 
1983  14,974.90  4,495.00 





































































































119.00  1.90 
209.80  14.10 
274.60  6.10 
413.60  14.10 
555.80  65.50 
627.10  66.10 
726.40  121.70 
830.80  92.20 
1,257.70  123.50 
I ,898.80  476.00 
2,573.40  456.70 
3,343.30  213.60 
4,830.00  196.50 
7,463.60  91.30 
899.70  10,239.70 
11,873.90  -243.70 
13,208.10  134.90 
15,675.60  -  1,695.80 
18,604.80  -2,379.40 
20,175.50  -727.90 
(continued) Table 8.1  (continued) 
Domestic Savings  Current  Gross Investment 
Statistical  Account 
Year  Total  Government  Corporate  Other  Deficit  Discrepancy  Total  Fixed  Stocks 
Panel  B (in percentage of  GNP) 
I965  14.06  6.44  5.20  2.42  -0.30  1.24  15.01  14.77  0.24 
I966  17.59  5.94  5.16  6.49  2.71  1.30  21.59  20.23  1.36 
1967  16.13  6.95  5.32  3.86  4.05  1.72  21.91  21.43  0.48 
1968  18.87  8.12  5.67  5.08  7.37  -0.36  25.88  25.02  0.85 
1969  22.12  7.30  5.63  9.19  1.34  -  0.63  28.83  25.79  3.04 
1970  17.68  7.32  4.81  5.55  7.03  0.46  25.17  22.77  2.40 
1971  16.32  5.88  4.65  5.78  8.73  0.08  25.13  21.52  3.61 
1972  18. I5  3.93  8.59  8.59  3.48  0.59  22.22  20.00  2.22 
1973  24.19  4.29  8.23  11.66  2.29  -0.80  25.68  23.38  2.30 
1974  21.10  2.93  8.25  9.91  10.93  -0.38  31.65  25.31  6.34 
1975  20.18  4.04  7.13  9.01  9.05  0.79  30.02  25.50  4.53 
1976  25.07  6.34  7.63  11.10  1.09  -0.54  25.62  24.09  1.54 
1977  28.09  5.38  8.11  14.59  -0.03  -0.31  27.75  26.66  I .08 
1978  29.40  6.42  7.35  15.64  2.17  -0.38  31.19  30.81  0.38 
1979  28.78  7.00  7.32  14.46  6.43  0.44  35.65  32.17  2.88 
1980  22.92  5.99  8.03 
1981  22.74  6.46  7.10  9.18  7.01  -0.18  29.57  29.27  0.30 
1982  23.58  6.38  7.33  9.87  3.83  0.13  27.56  30.90  -3.34 
1983  25.39  7.62  7.41  10.30  2.07  0.05  27.51  31.54  -4.03 
1984  27.55  7.75  7.53  12.28  1.65  0.08  29.28  30.38  -1.10 
8.90  8.79  0.00  31.71  32.38  -0.66 
Source:  EPB, Major Statistics of  Korean Economy,  1986, and BOK,  Flow of Funds Statistics,  1984. 
Note:  Statistical Discrepancy is the difference between the depreciation allowance from the two sources (see discussion in  sec. 8.3). 239  KoredChapter 8 
Household Savings ---- 
Government Savings -  Corporate Savings 
I  SAVl NGS/GNP 
17.5 
Fig. 8.2  Components of savings/GNP 
GNP.  It  also provides  some  evidence for an  inverse  relationship  between 
government and household savings, particularly during the mid- 1970s. 
We  turn next to an analysis of  household savings, the most variable and, 
since 1972, the largest component of domestic savings. There are two facts 
to be  explained.  First,  how  did Korea managed  to triple household  saving 
rates from 5  percent  during 1966-68  to  15 percent  during 1977-79?  And 
second, why have there been such large fluctuations  in the household saving 
rate? 
Household  savings  are  computed  as  the  difference  between  domestic 
savings  and  the  sum  of  general  government  and  corporate  savings.  As 
already  mentioned,  they  also  include  the  savings  of  unincorporated 
businesses.  Therefore,  part  of  this  component  is  a  capital  consumption 
allowance. Table 8.2 divides household savings into depreciation (HSD) and 
other  (HSO). Not  surprisingly, the  depreciation  has  been  quite  stable  as a 
share  of  GNP,  ranging  from  2.0  to  2.7  percent.  Movements  in  this 
component clearly cannot explain the large fluctuations in the total. 
Figure 8.3 plots the ratio of household  savings excluding depreciation  to 
disposable  personal  income  (HSOIYD). It  shows  that  savings  have  risen 
relative to income in a ratchet  fashion, which is suggestive of a permanent 
income model of  consumption.  In such a model, temporary and unexpected 
rises in income will have a relatively small affect on consumption,  leading to 
short-run jumps in  savings.  The model  seems particularly  relevant  for the 
Korean economy with its periodic growth spurts and slowdowns. 
Another factor which may help to explain the large fluctuations in savings 
is the real  interest  rate.  Some authors have argued that increases in interest 240  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Table 8.2  Household Savings 
~ 
Household Savings 
Year  Depreciation  Other  Disposable Income  (SND/YD)"  (SND/Y)b 
1965  18.00  1  SO  853.70  0.00  0.00 
1966  24.40  42.90  1,022.40  0.04  0.04 
1967  32.40  17.10  1,279.30  0.01  0.01 
1968  35.60  48.30  I,681.10  0.03  0.03 
1969  45.60  152.40  2,058.70  0.08  0.07 
1970  54.80  98.00  2,138.40  0.05  0.04 
1971  66.60  128.50  2,676.30  0.05  0.04 
1972  89.20  267.80  3,322.30  0.08  0.06 
1973  131.00  496.10  4,210.00  0.12  0.09 
1974  199.00  544.90  5,867.30  0.10  0.07 
1975  241 .SO  667.50  7,855.90  0.09  0.07 
1976  317.60  1,223.00  10,385.20  0.12  0.09 
1977  416.10  2,227.80  10,385.20  0.22  0.12 
1978  570.50  3,217.60  13,500.70  0.25  0.13 
1979  678.00  3,84  I.  80  23,260.90  0.17  0.12 
1980  799.20  2,465.90  27,294.20  0.09  0.07 
1981  959.40  3,184.30  33.815.60  0.10  0.07 
1982  1,260.90  3,744.00  37,863.60  0.10  0.07 
"Nondepreciation sdvings/disposable income. 
bNondepreciation savingsiGNP. 
0.25- 









Fig. 8.3  Ratio of household savings to disposable income 
Note:  Household saving and disposable income both exclude depreciation allowance. 241  KoredChapter 8 
rates relative to inflation generate additional savings and that financial reform 
in 1965 was the key to understanding the jump in Korean saving rates during 
the mid-1960s.'  Giovannini (1983) and others have found little sensitivity of 
saving to interest rates in empirical studies of a broad sample of  developing 
countries. Thus, it is interesting to examine the relationship between saving 
and  interest  rates  for  the  more  recent  period,  1965-82.  Korean  bank 
deposits  have  been  adjusted  a  number  of  times  during  this  interval,  but 
adjustments have typically not kept pace with inflation, leading to substantial 
variation in real interest rates. 
We assume a simple structure to explain saving behavior. Consumption is 
assumed to depend positively on income and negatively on the real return to 
saving.  The  consumption  function,  given  by  equation  (I),  allows  for 
different marginal propensities  to consume out of  permanent  and transitory 
incomes. Equation  (2) state that household  savings are identically  equal to 
disposable  income  less  consumption.  Disposable  income  is  taken  net  of 
depreciation,  so  that  the  structure  determines  only  the  determinants  of 
nondepreciation savings. 
(1)  C = OL~  + (YIYP i OL~Y~'  + a3RR + E 
(2)  HSO  = YD -  C 
where  YD =  YP  +  YT  = Y - T - HSD; Y is personal  income; YD is 
personal  disposable income,  less depreciation;  YP and  YT are  (perceived) 
permanent and transitory income; C is household consumption; RR is the real 
interest  rate;  and HSO  and HSD  are the depreciation and  nondepreciation 
savings. 
Temporary and permanent income were established as follows. Disposable 
income in period  t was estimated  as a linear function of  disposable income 
from periods  t -  1 and  t -  2. Permanent income was measured  as the fitted 
values  from  this  regression  while  residuals  were  taken  as  a  measure  of 
transitory  income.  Using  this procedure,  transitory  income ranged  from  2 
percent  to  nearly  10 percent  of  total  disposable  income.  As  expected, 
transitory income is very large and negative during 1970, 1980, and 1982. It 
is  large  and  positive  during  1974,  1978,  and  1981. We  use  the  nominal 
interest  rate  on  one-year  time  deposits,  deflated  by  the  CPI.  Other 
specifications,  for example  the  use  of  curb market  interest rates, did  not 
significantly alter the estimation results. 
The estimation results from equation (1) are given below in equation (3), 
with  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  They  very  strongly  support  a  permanent- 
temporary income model for Korean consumption behavior. 
(3)  C = 91.20 + 0.88 YP + 0.55 YT - 16.50 RR 
(0.44)  (77.62)  (4.26)  (-0.95) 
Sample: 1965-82;  adjusted R2 = 0.98; Durbin Watson = 1.78. 242  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
They show a marginal propensity to consume out of  permanent  income  of 
0.88.  The  marginal  propensity  to  consume  out  of  temporary  income  is 
significantly  smaller,  0.55.  The  estimates  for  the  constant  term  and  the 
influence of the real interest rate, however, are measured imprecisely and are 
not significantly different from zero. 
The regression  does not provide support for the view that changes in real 
interest rates have been a critical determinant of saving behavior.  Instead, it 
emphasizes the importance of the high average growth of disposable income 
as an explanation for the impressive rise in household savings, and the large 
swings in real  growth rates as an explanation  for the cyclic fluctuations in 
saving rates. However, the very dramatic rise in Korean household savings is 
unusual and has played  an important part in Korea’s successful adjustment. 
Korean saving behavior clearly warrants additional analysis. 
8.2  Investment 
8.2.1  Trends in Fixed Capital Formation 
We  begin  with  a  discussion  of  the  general  trends  in  gross  investment, 
focusing on the behavior of fixed capital formation.  As already mentioned, 
and as  illustrated  in Figure  8.1,  investment  as  a  share of  income  follows 
cycles which  coincide with  the five-year  development plans.  In the first or 
second  year  of  each plan,  there  has  been  a  sudden  rise  in  fixed  capital 
formation. The increases continue through the third or fourth year of the plan 
and taper off somewhat in the last one to two years. 
The main thrust of each five-year plan is summarized in table 8.3. In table 
8.4 we summarize the shares of gross domestic capital formation by industry 
and by type of capital good during 1972-84.  This period includes the third, 
fourth, and  original  fifth  five-year  plans.  The major  developments  during 
each plan period do in fact coincide with the stated plan objectives. 
During the third plan,  1972-76,  and particularly  during 1972-74,  there 
was an increase in allocation to agriculture. Most of this increase came from 
declines  in  allocation  to  social  overhead  capital-transportation,  storage, 
and communication.  However, this sector retained the largest share of total 
investment, with manufacturing a close second. 
During the fourth plan  there was a decline  in the  share of investment in 
agriculture. Allocation to manufacturing and social overhead also fell, with 
services  growing  substantially  (especially  wholesale  and  retail  trade  and 
public  administration).  The decline  in  manufacturing  occurred  during  the 
1980-81  retrenchment from the Big Push. During 1977-81,  over 77 percent 
of investment in equipment in manufacturing went to the HC industries. It is 
also interesting that equipment, as a share of investment, jumped from 31 to 243  KoredChapter 8 














Emphasis on basic industries for import substitution and expansion of  social overhead 
capital 
Export-oriented industrialization to promote labor-intensive light manufacturing 
Development of  rural sector-balanced  economic growth and stability 
Deepening industrial structure through promotion of  HC industries 
Initially-continued  push toward HC industries 
From 1978/7%shift  toward industrial restructuring and price stabilization 
Priority to economic stabilization, given expectation of  unfavorable domestic and foreign 
conditions 
Shift away from government intervention, including trade and financial liberalization 
Table 8.4  Composition of Investment During Five-Year Plans (as shares of  total, 
period averages) 
1972-76  1977-81  1982  1983  1984 
Sectors 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery  10.6  6.9  6.  I  6.1  5.8 
Manufacturing  21.7  18.1  13.6  13.2  15.5 
Services  32.5  40.6  44.5  46.3  46.2 
Social overhead capital  35.2  31.1  35.8  34.1  32.1 
Type of  good 
Transport, machinery, and other equipment  31.2  39.6  38.9  36.8  38.0 
Construction  53.8  54.4  65.1  69.8  62.6 
Change in  stocks  15.0  6.0  -4.0  -6.6  -0.6 
Source:  Ministry of  Finance, Economic Sfofistics  Yearbook, various issues. 
40 percent as stock accumulations  declined.  Construction’s  share remained 
relatively  constant. 
The table  shows that  the  shift  toward  investment  in  services  continued 
during  the  fifth  plan.3  However,  the  increase  came  at  the  expense  of 
manufacturing,  not agriculture. The counterpart  has been a shift from stock 
accumulation  to construction,  with  equipment  retaining  37-38  percent  of 
total investment. 244  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
8.2.2  Five-Year Plans 
Design 
This section uses the revised  fifth five-year economic and  social plan  to 
illustrate  how  the  plans  are  put  t~gether.~  There  are  four  basic  steps 
described below. Relevant  figures are given in table 8.5. 
The first step is to target a real growth rate. Here, labor force projections 
implied a required  3 percent  per year  increase  in job openings to maintain 
employment. Labor  productivity  was projected  to grow at 4.5 percent  per 
year.  Thus,  a  7.5 percent  annual  increase  in  real  GNP was  targeted  for 
1984- 86. 
The second  step was  to identify  the  fixed capital formation  required  to 
generate  the  target  growth  rate.  Given  the  estimated  incremental  capital 
output  ratio  of  4.72,  targeted  fixed  investment  in  real  terms  could  be 
calculated.  Together with assumptions about inventory behavior,  projections 
about gross investment  were formulated. 
The third  step was to  make projections  about  inflation  and use  them  to 
translate the real targets for output and investment into nominal series. 
The final  step began  with  the  realization  that  gross investment  must  be 
financed  through  a  combination  of  domestic  and  foreign  savings.  The 
Table 8.5  Revised Fifth Five-Year Plan 
Fifth Plan 
1982”  1983b  1984  1985  1986 
1980 Constant prices 









Domestic savings (S) 
Marginal propensity 
to save (MPS) 
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Source:  Government of  Korea (1983). 
“Actual. 
hProjected 
Note:  Figures in billions of won unless otherwise indicated 245  KoredChapter 8 
technique  for  projecting  domestic  savings  is  to  predict  the  ratios  of 
household, government,  and corporate savings to GNP. As shown, each was 
expected to rise over time in connection with a variety of measures designed 
to encourage savings. For example, household savings were predicted to rise 
in response to expanded financial instruments and banking services. Together 
with  projected  nominal  GNP, the  ratios were used  to predict total  nominal 
domestic savings. Foreign savings were then given by the difference between 
investment  and  domestic  savings.  Perhaps  the  key  implication  of  the  way 
that the five-year plans were formulated is that foreign savings is determined 
as a residual. 
The five-year  plans  also contain  detailed projections  for current  account 
behavior.  Documentation  of  earlier  plans  contained  projections  about  the 
path  of  external  debt, including  projected  debt service  payments,  and  the 
allocation of  debt between  short- and long-term  borrowing.  Unfortunately, 
these  figures  are  not  readily  available for the  original  or  the  revised  fifth 
five-year plans. 
Three questions emerge. First,  have the plans successfully achieved their 
investment  targets,  and  what  are  the  implications  for the determinants  of 
investment  in  Korea?  Second,  how  successful  have  planners  been  in 
forecasting savings? And finally, we look at the other side of the equation to 
examine the implications for current account behavior and debt accumulation 
in Korea. 
Investment Targets 
Table 8.6 shows planned and actual investment as a share of GNP, and real 
growth rates during the fourth and the revised fifth five-year plans.  During 
the fourth plan, investment consistently exceeded target as a share of GNP. It 
is interesting that this was true both during the beginning of the plan period, 
Table 8.6  Planned versus Actual Rates of Investment and Growth 
Real Growth (70)  InvestmenVGNP 
Total  Fixed 
Plan  Actual  Plan  Actual  Plan  Actual 
Fourth plan 
1977  10.0  12.7  27.0  28.0  -  26.7 
30.8  1978  9.0  9.7  26.3  31.0 
1979  9.0  6.5  25.9  36.0  -  32.8 
1980  9.0  -5.2  25.9  32.0  32.3 
28.7  1981  9.0  6.6  26.0  30.0 
1984  7.5  8.4  28.7  29  31.5  30.5 




Fifth  plan 
~ 
Source:  Government of  Korea (1976): Government of  Korea (1983): and EPB. Major Economic Stofistics. 
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when real  growth rates were higher than projected, and during the second 
half of  the program, when the 1979-80  crisis gave rise to an unanticipated 
decline in economic activity. 
What  is  an  appropriate  model  for  the  determination  of  fixed  capital 
formation? The  alternative  suggested by  the  preceding  discussion  is  that 
government policies and  incentives essentially set a minimum  investment 
level as part of  the five-year plans and they ensure adequate (domestic or 
foreign) financing for any approved investment project, soliciting enough to 
ensure that  the minimum level is met  or exceeded.  In  such a framework, 
firms  on  the  periphery  are  totally  at  the  mercy  of  market  conditions  in 
obtaining financing, however,  variations  in  their  position  may  have  little 
impact on the aggregate investment figures. 
Fixed  capital formation as  a  share of  GNP has  not  been  very  cyclical 
during  1970-85.  For  example,  the  investment ratio jumped  between  the 
boom year 1973 and the downturn in 1974-75.5 Some authors have focused 
on  credit  access as  the  key  to  investment  determination.6 These  models 
suggest that private credit availability and curb market loan rates be included 
in regressions to explain investment. In regressions on quarterly data, curb 
market rates have negative coefficients, but do not tend to be significant. On 
balance, it is difficult to assess the quantitative importance of  the standard 
neoclassical variables as determinants of  investment. However, the role of 
the  government  in  explicitly  allocating  credit  across  industries  and  to 
particular firms is clear. 
Planned versus Actual Behavior of the Current Account and External Debt 
When actual economic performance diverges from the five-year plans, the 
differences have tended to be higher investment than projected, with smaller 
domestic savings, implying a deterioration of the current account. How have 
the  authorities tended  to  react  to  this  situation?  There  are  at  least  two 
alternatives from which they could choose. They could simply make up the 
shortfall in financing by  increasing external borrowing (presumably through 
bank loans), and accept the resulting increase in external debt. Alternatively, 
they could  hold  firmly onto their projected path of  foreign borrowing and 
finance the current account deficit through a reduction in foreign exchange 
reserves or, if  possible, through foreign direct investment. 
Table 8.7 shows planned and actual figures for the key  variables for 1977 
and  1978. In  1977 the  plan  predicted  the  trade balance quite accurately, 
however, a much  stronger service account than anticipated (from overseas 
construction) meant that the current account was about $650 million larger 
than  expected.  This  favorable outturn  was  offset  by  an  additional  $635 
million  accumulation of  foreign exchange,  not  by  a reduction  in external 
borrowing.  In  fact,  Korea  borrowed  almost  $600  million  more  than 
projected. 
In  1978 the trade balance was  much worse than projected. Exports did 
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Table 8.7  External Balance: Planned versus Actual, 1977-78 
(in millions of  U.S.  dollars) 
1977  1978 
Plan  Actual  Plan  Actual 
~~  ~ 
Current account deficit  634  -  12.3  237  1,085.2 
Reserve accumulation  71  1  1,346  61  1  63 I 
31.7  -  312.0  Emrs and omissions  - 
Increased foreign debt  1,542  2,129  1,667  2,174 
Source:  Government of  Korea (1976). 
considerably.  Korean  authorities did  not  offset  the  development through 
reserve  depletion  to  dampen  the  effect  of  external  debt.  Instead,  they 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves, approximately in line with the plan 
targets.  Again,  external  borrowing  exceeded  the  projection,  with  an 
especially large jump in private long-term borrowing. 
During  1979-8 1 unexpected domestic and foreign developments drasti- 
cally  altered  the  environment and  the  economic performance.  Arguably, 
circumstances had  changed by  so much that the targets and the projections 
from the fourth plan were no longer relevant, and that it is not meaningful to 
compare these targets  with  actual outcomes. It  is  notable, however, that 
investment  remained  high  and  stable  during  this  period,  financed  by 
extensive foreign borrowing. 
The clear pattern through the fourth five-year plan  is one which places 
investment as the number one priority, financing it with external borrowing 
whenever necessary, in spite of  potential consequences for domestic price 
stability  and  the  burden  of  the  debt.  Since  the  1979-80  crisis,  the 
government has stated that economic stabilization has been named the top 
priority and that concern over debt accumulation would preclude continued 
treatment of  foreign borrowing as a residual. 
We  conclude this section by asking whether there is any evidence of  such 
a shift in  policy. Unfortunately, the revised  fifth plan  does not  make the 
projected  debt  accumulation  explicit.  Table  8.8  focuses  on  the  current 
account and reserves. Errors and omissions, which became large during the 
early 1980s, are also reported. 
Again, in  1984 the current account deficit was larger than anticipated, as 
were errors and omissions. Authorities did not  finance some of  the deficit 
with  reserves, but  accumulated  one and  a  half  times  the  target  amount. 
Presumably, the increase in external debt also exceeded the projection. There 
is  no  evidence  here  of  a  shift  from  an  approach  to  macroeconomic 
management in which external borrowing is residual. 
The outcomes in  1985 and  1986 are more ambiguous. The 1985 current 
account deficit was  larger than  expected, but  this  time  foreign  exchange 
accumulation slowed down, mitigating the implied rise in  borrowing. This 248  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Table 8.8  Reserve Accumulation: Planned versus Actual,  1984-86 
(in millions of U.S.  dollars) 
1984  1985  1986 
Plan  Actual  Plan  Actual  Plan  Actual 
Current account deficit  1 .ooo  1,373  300  887  -400  4,617 
Reserve accumulation  490  740  400  99  700  207 
Errors and omissions  600  894  600  880  300  543 
Foreign reserves  7,400  7,650  7,800  7,749  8,500  7,955 
Source: Government of  Korea (1983). and EPB, Major  Statistics of  the Korean Economy, various issues 
episode  provides  some support for a policy  shift  such that  variables  other 
than external debt could adjust to unexpected  developments. However,  the 
evidence  is not particularly  strong when considered  cumulatively.  The total 
reserve  accumulation  during  1984-85  was  very  close  to  the  cumulated 
projection,  and  in  that  sense  there  was  no  adjustment  in  reserve 
accumulation. 
Finally,  in  1986 there  was  a  massive  external  surplus.  The  plan  had 
predicted a small surplus of $400 million.  The actual surplus was more than 
ten  times  that  figure,  enabling  Korea  to  reduce  its  external  debt  stock. 
Although  reserve  accumulation  was  smaller  than  projected,  the  episode 
provides little information about which external variables would be treated as 
residuals if domestic savings were too low to cover investment. 
8.3  Disaggregation of Domestic Savings Data 
In  order  to  accurately  examine  the  determinants  of  Korean  saving 
behavior, it was important to disaggregate savings. Given the available data, 
the  finest  decomposition  possible  was  into  three  categories:  general 
government,  public  and  private  corporations,  and  households.  Unfortu- 
nately,  the household  category  includes  households, nonprofit  institutions, 
and unincorporated businesses.  It is not possible to separately identify these 
elements. 
In  this  section  we  describe the  data  and  method  used  to compute  the 
domestic savings figures that were given in tables 8.1 and 8.2. 
EPB and BOK report domestic savings for government, corporations, and 
households.  These data include net  transfers from  abroad,  however,  they 
exclude allowances for capital consumption, which  are reported separately. 
Flow of  funds tables  were used  to  assign depreciation allowances between 
the three sectors. BOK National Income Accounts statistics  also provide  a 
breakdown, however,  those figures assume that no depreciation  is attribut- 
able  to  the  household  sector.  This  is  unrealistic,  given  that  this  sector 
includes unincorporated businesses. 249  KoredChapter 9 
Two problems  arise. First,  the  total  depreciation  from  the  FOF data  is 
consistently  smaller than  the  total  given  by  BOK  or EPB  in  the  National 
Income Accounts. The discrepancy ranged from less than  1 percent of total 
gross investment to as high as 10 percent in a few years. The average was 3 
percent of total gross investment. The discrepancy was assigned to corporate 
depreciation, which is therefore measured as the residual. 
The  second  problem  is  that  of  the  FOF  disaggregation  is  currently 
available  only  through  1982.  For  1983 and  1984  the  decomposition  of 
depreciation was estimated based on the average shares of each sector in the 
total during  1976- 82. 
Korean  GDP  is  computed  from  the  expenditure  side.  Therefore,  the 
residual appears in the expenditure side of  the accounts and is not included in 
the  savings  estimates.  This  explains  why  the  column  for  statistical 
discrepancy appears in the tables. 
Finally,  the  method  for computing  National  Income Accounts  data  has 
recently been revised. The data used in this chapter are based on consistent 
data, using  the  old method,  through  1984. These figures are unfortunately 
not  comparable  with  figures  based  on  data  using  the  new  method.  In 
particular, the two methods give very different figures for fixed investment 
as a share of GNP during  1980-84.  However,  the trends in the two series 
are similar. 
Disposable income data were computed  from the BOK National  Income 
Accounts. The data subtract direct taxes and net transfers from the household 
sector to the government and to the rest of  the world. 
9  Exchange Rate, Trade, and 
Industrial Policy 
The Korean  economy  has  been  one of  the  world’s  most  rapidly  growing 
economies in recent decades. Since Korea launched its first five-year plan in 
1962, it has grown at over 8 percent per year on average. The growth pace 
has  slowed on occasion  when the economy was faced with  oil shocks and 
sluggish  world  demand, but,  overall,  exports have  fueled  growth  even in 
periods when  adverse situations abroad reduced  foreign demand for export 
goods  and  raised  domestic  inflation.  Simply  on  the  basis  of  growth 
performance, the adoption of an outward-oriented growth strategy in place of 
import  substitution  could  be  considered  an  epochal  change  in  trade  and 
industrial policies. 
The period  from  May  1960 to  1965 is regarded  as a time  of  transition 
during  which  Korean  trade  and  industrial  policies  were  reoriented  toward 